

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

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I. THE SOCIAL BEHAVIOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Within the last few years the entrance of psychologists into the socio-psychological field has tipped the scales of interest toward the psychological side. Though still important to sociologists, social psychology is now regarded by many as a branch distinctly of psychology, dealing with the responses of the individual to the social part of his environment and describing the social consciousness of the individual.

Thus Hunter (50) regards "interstimulation and response" as the fundamental fact to be studied. Broadening the field to include the social behavior of animals, he rejects Ellwood's limitation of the social category to "consciously interacting" groups. Hunter recognizes that behavior often serves not only as response, but as stimulus, to other individuals. Gault (37) similarly defines social psychology as a study of "interactions among animals" and, more specifically, of reactions of human beings to one another. His illustrations refer to responses of individuals *in the presence of* others, rather than exclusively *to* one another. Such situations are classified by Allport (1) as responses to "contributory social stimulation," which underlie the influence of the social surroundings in the "co-acting group" and the crowd. They are distinguishable from the "direct" social stimulations which occur in conversation, discussion, conflict, and all face-to-face groups. Allport also includes the behavior comprised in the "making of social stimulations" (language, expression,

gesture) as a portion of the field. Dunlap (27), though developing a slightly different emphasis, gives both formulation and respect to the viewpoint stated above; while Smith and Guthrie (94) employ a double definition embracing the "individual's response to his fellow men" and "concerted behavior" within groups.

Sociological writers are approaching the same definition. Bogardus (17) designates the field as one of "intersocial stimulation and response." He throws the emphasis upon the development of personalities and social attitudes out of interstimulation. In the latter and more interesting portion of his book he parts company with the casual and psychological viewpoint, and discusses group aspects and leadership descriptively and sociologically. The reviewer would regard Bogardus' attempt to ascribe causal significance to *the group* (as in the "interaction between group and individual" or "between one group and another") as a failure of analysis. Individuals stimulate and respond, but groups do not (except as individuals). Williams (103) defines social psychology as "the science of the motives of people living in social relations," and develops his definition through a survey of the rivalries of economic and social conflict. The discussion is practical, but it seldom penetrates to the psychological foundations. Keeping close to the concrete interactions of individuals, his work falls within the scope of the definition of social psychology which we have been tracing. Bogardus and Williams are telic and ethical in their outlook, rather than explanatory.

Social psychology therefore has become fairly identified with situations in which *individuals stimulate and respond to one another*, a formulation which, for convenience, we may call the "social behavior viewpoint." Although in many ways an advantage, this somewhat precise definition narrows the field to data in which the psychologist, preëminently, is interested. Many human responses, for example, reactions to tools, soil, and climate are psychological facts as important to the *sociologist* as reactions to other human beings. The "group" standpoint also remains as the legitimate center of sociological interest. Hence Ellwood (29) prefers a study of *the psychic factors involved in the "origin, development, structure, and functioning of social groups."* The expression of this view becomes somewhat metaphorical when Ellwood (30) speaks of "a web of intercommunication" (language) along which are transmitted "mental patterns" from individual to individual, thus permitting the group-wide dissemination of "ideals," "values," and culture in

general. The social behavior viewpoint would reduce the transmission of these mental patterns, which are described as if floating at large in society, to terms of stimulus and response between individuals.

II. THE PLURALISTIC APPROACH: "SOCIETAL PSYCHOLOGY"

The more definite delimitation of the field of social psychology has thus left out of account a number of problems for whose classification a new socio-psychological science seems to be indicated. These problems may best be summarized under Professor Giddings' viewpoint of "pluralistic behavior". The basic fact here is not interaction (social behavior) but a plurality of separate and similarly acting individuals. Giddings (38) begins, on the subjective side, with a plurality of like-minded individuals, each conscious of his similarity to the others. Objectively the situation is a "plurum" of similarly reacting units. Stimulations from the others, being closely like stimulations received from one's self in the same activities, develop on the one hand a consciousness of kind, and upon the other, a reinforcement of one's behavior through the like responses of others. We tend to respond more readily to reactions which are like our own. The phenomenon agrees closely with that which, under the name of "social facilitation", Allport (1, Ch. 11) has recognized as basic in the co-acting group. Giddings' principle, however, is deeper than the social behavior setting, and prior to it; for he assumes a plurum of reacting units similar in constitution and therefore in response before any interaction has taken place. Two important conditions influence the extent and pattern of the plural response. They are (1) the range (number of individuals reached by the stimulus), and (2) the "reaction area" of the collective response as determined by imperativeness of the stimulus, degree of homogeneity, and similar factors (39).¹ The Willeys (102) attempt to explain the consciousness of kind as due to a conditioning stimulus (common element, *i.e.*, "kind") which evokes the reaction attaching to the original situation in which kind was experienced. Humphrey (49) has made a similar use of the conditioned response to explain that resistance to the unfamiliar in conduct upon which adherence to custom is based.

¹ Further developments of the "pluralistic behavior" concept, together with suggestions for a measuring technique, are to be found in Professor Giddings' *The Scientific Study of Human Society*, University of North Carolina Press. This important work appeared too late to be included in this review.

The pluralistic approach as developed by Kantor rests upon uniform (or institutionalized) responses to stimulating objects (*e.g.*, weather, culture objects, and personages) common to the group. He rejects both instincts and physiological psychology as false or irrelevant viewpoints (54, 55, 56). Natural biological similarities are recognized; but the *acquired* or *cultural* reactions learned in the social environment (tradition) and common to the group he regards as the true field for scientific social psychology (54, 56, 58). This theory, which throws valuable light on the nature of institutions, belongs rather to the pluralistic than to the interactional field of socio-psychological science. Only genetically, that is, in the individual's learning of cultural reactions, is social behavior involved. Smith and Guthrie (94) also list a number of situations which call forth common, or "concerted", responses. These "coenotropes" are the basis of tradition, morality, and institutions. A similar conception in terms of social attitudes (approval, etc.) is suggested by Reuter (85).

Summary. The two psychological approaches described in sections I and II may be summarized and differentiated as follows. The second position will be stated first.

A. There is, first, the mass of similar responses of the members of a group or society to the common objects (other than persons) of their environment. These like responses, innate or acquired, are the very stuff of tradition, custom, institutions and organized social living. The science dealing with them is fundamental, relatively simple, and constitutes a psychological restatement, in behavior terms, of all the social sciences. Using the term, and in part the conception, of Giddings (39), we may call it *societal psychology*.

B. Secondly, there arises upon the simple pluralistic basis phenomena of a secondary and complex nature. These are the responses of individuals *to one another*, that is, the making of *social* stimulations and the responding to them. Facts belonging to this class comprise the field of *social psychology*.

Since both sciences are psychological, both deal only with *individuals* as units of explanation. Group aspects are used merely to depict and delimit the mass phenomena to be explained. There is no "psychology of society" as contrasted with the psychology of the individual. Societal psychology deals with individuals as discrete units of pluralistic aggregates; social psychology deals with individuals as stimulating and responding to one another. In spite of

the obvious overlapping and interweaving of these two fields, the distinction seems to be both warranted by the literature, and useful.

III. PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL CAUSATION

A few dying echoes of the social mind metaphor are still to be heard. With the "collective racial unconscious" of the Jung school we may class Rivers' elaboration of social conflict upon the analogy of mental conflict in the individual (87). Bodenhafer (16) argues that every sort of datum studied really begins as an aggregate of units. Opponents of the group mind have been aggressive. M. Ginsberg (40) finds the "group mind" and "general will" to be concepts quite incompatible with psychological notions of mind and will. Perry's amusing analysis (79) deflates collective mind to verbalism and abstraction of inconsequentialities. Laird (62) and Hubert (48) have given further penetrating analyses. Allport has assailed Rivers' pathological metaphor, and has urged against the practice of prefixing the term "social" to psychological terms (*e.g.*, "social habits"), a usage likely to prove a veiled form of the group mind fallacy (4). Sociologists have objected to Allport's contention, in the same paper, that such concepts as "the group" and "the super-organic order" are valid only for descriptive, *not for explanatory*, purposes. Every science, he says, draws its causal principles from the science just beneath it in the hierarchy of complexity of data. The social sciences, therefore, may *depict* phenomena in group and culture terms, but they must *explain* them through the individual, that is, by the aid of psychology. Sacred sociological soil is here invaded.

IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Instinct versus Social Determination. Many sociologists, welcoming support for their social determinism, have joined forces with the critical movement, current in psychology, against the theory of instincts. McDougall has striven doughtily against his critics, and has renewed his appeal to sociologists (71, 72). There have been a few recent books on social topics written from the standpoint of instincts. The most important are those by Groves (44, 45), Bartlett (11), and Eldridge (28). Miller (75) has argued for the existence of a powerful "group instinct". A number of writers, however, use the term "instinct" with guarded reservations or apologies. The following are among the social psychologists who

have rejected specific and complex instincts: Dewey (26), Bogardus (17), Gault (37), (retains indifferentiated "instinct"), Josey (52), Kantor (57), Williams (103), (substitutes "dispositions"), Dunlap (27), (substitutes physiologically grounded "desires"), Allport (1), (criticizes in particular the maturation theory), and Bernard (12). The "gregarious instinct" has been especially attacked by Cason (23), and Suttie (95); and the "maternal instinct" by R. Reed (83). Balz and Pott (8) emphasize the obscuring of instinctive elements by later modification in relation to habit, intelligence, and special capacities. Bernard, in his monumental work (12), catalogues inconsistencies and obscurities in the use of the concept, and considers that so-called "instincts" are really habits built up through the play of the social environment upon innumerable, nonspecific, reflex tendencies which are present at birth. He further analyzes systematically the formative influences present in the environment throughout life (13). Having in his book hustled instincts unceremoniously out of the house, Bernard, in a subsequent discussion (14), slams the door on them.

Dewey's position (26) may be instructively compared with that of McDougall in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*. The latter asserts an elaborate innate basis of behavior as an explanation of societal facts. Instincts are definite, specific, and socially oriented. Dewey, on the other hand, maintains that, although simple and random instinctive activities may have existed at birth, they have been overlaid by learning through social agencies to an unrecognizable extent. Society rather than instinct is responsible for the nature, conduct, and morality of mankind. Social psychology in this sense is fundamental to all psychology. In criticism, it may be said that Dewey's view, in its extreme, involves the "group fallacy". "Society" does not teach the individual anything, but only other individuals who are members of the "society". Balz and Pott (8) make the same error of considering the elementary social situation, a group of two, as the primary causal fact. Secondly, it is possible to overdo the theory of social determination. Few indeed of the critics of instinct have given fair recognition to McDougall for his insistence that there is something directive and formulative (though it need not be interpreted as purpose) behind the learning process. There is a determining tendency or drive which directs habit acquisition along useful lines (protection, sex, etc.), rather than toward haphazard patterns. This is the truly inherited factor; it may be mechanistically explained, but it can not be denied.

The reviewer (1, Ch. 3) has conceived this innate factor to be a relatively small number of reflexes, present in infancy, which are prepotent (*i.e.*, control the final common path) over other reflexes. Upon this basis he has worked out, through conditioning and learning, a substitute for the doctrine of instincts. McDougall and Dewey seem to him, therefore, to be both partially right, though neither exclusively. There is an innate dynamic factor (prepotent responses) directing the social life of the individual; and at the same time other individuals, as "vehicles" of tradition and culture, help to modify these responses, through social stimulation (language, etc.), into socially accepted patterns of behavior. The individual makes society; society (other individuals) makes the individual.

Personality, Social Attitudes, Adjustments. Much of the modern treatment in this important field is derived from psychoanalysis. All the recent textbooks have given attention to the social adjustments of personality. The family environment is studied by Groves (45), and Allport (1). Klüver (60) finds difficulty in connecting sociological types (*e.g.*, criminal) with proposed psychological categories. G. W. Allport applies the *Gestaltlehre* (6) in a demonstration that a personality must be socially "intuited" as a *whole*, whose meaning is lost upon analysis into traits or profiles. Burgess (19) and Bogardus (17) show the importance of social factors in determining the trend of personal development. Through their definition of "the person" as an "individual with status" they attempt (unjustifiably, the reviewer thinks) to lift the main problem of personality over into sociology. Social-self attitudes derived through identification with the mother are discussed by Burrow (20), while Willey and Herskovitz (100) find identification to be important in the relation of employer and employee. Ream's results (81) indicate that people prefer as working mates individuals with an activity level similar to their own.

Social and Religious Problems. Ames (7) has developed a definition of religion as the highest social consciousness within the group. Suggestion and other social behavior phenomena have been found by Shepherd (90) to be regularly employed in revival services. In addition to further crowd studies (70) Martin has given us a stimulating work showing the presence of neurotic manifestations and regressional attitudes toward the father throughout religious practices and symbols (67). Mecklin's account of the Ku Klux Klan (73) reveals such psychological factors as fear, love of ritual, and compensation for mediocrity. Intelligence levels in the general

population and in the flux of immigration have received attention from Brigham (18) and Gault (37). Willis (104) finds first-born children to be slightly less intelligent than second-born. Psychological problems of rural communities are considered by Groves (44), while Friedman (34) suggests reasons for the nervousness of the Jew.

Experiment in Social Psychology. Using groups for experimentation Whittemore (99) found differing effects of competition upon quantity and quality of work. Gates (36) discovered very slight effects upon performance due to being watched at work. Marked influences upon attention to lectures were found by Griffith to result from the social stimulations received from surrounding members of the audience (43).

V. PSYCHOLOGY IN RELATION TO HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

The work of psychoanalytic interpretation of historical leaders and movements has been profitably continued by Hartman (47), Barnes (10), and O'Higgins (78). Kallen (53) argues significantly that since political science studies political behavior, it is really a form of psychology. Merriam (74) and Gosnell (42) have pointed out vital relations between psychological measurement and political procedure. Governmental process and the concepts of sovereignty, rights, liberty, and progress have been lucidly analyzed by Barnes (9). Psychological weakness of representation and detachment of executives and legislators from their constituents have been dealt with by M. Ginsberg (40) and Weeks (98). Garth (35) bases successful democracy upon freedom for learning by trial and error. The crowd-like speciousness of public opinion and political control is the theme of Martin (68, 69); while Lippman's challenge (64) portrays the "stereotyping" of popular beliefs through habit and conditioned emotional response. Willey and Rice (101) have measured the influence of a speech by W. J. Bryan upon the religious and scientific convictions of Dartmouth students. Eldridge (28) bases the hope of progress upon the ability of the sponsors of enlightened control to get possession of the popular suggestion process and other forms of the "technique of democracy."

Social and political attitudes (radicalism, conservatism, etc.) are vividly treated in current writing. The intricate mazes of inferiority conflict, projection, anger, rationalization, biased reasoning, hypocrisy, and distortions of scientific attitude are discussed by Wolfe

(106, 107, 108), Rice (86), E. F. Reed (82), Reid (84), Ogburn (77), Taylor (96), Allport (1), B. Ginzburg (41), Pruette (80), and Schmalhausen (88, 89). Very important contributions have been made to problems of leadership and group conflict adjustment by Follett (32) and Lindeman (63). Suppression and compromise are both rejected, and the possibility of an "integrated" solution involving, by finer analysis, the real needs of *all* claimants is concretely illustrated. Miss Follett applies her "participation theory" suggestively to existing political practice. Recent Freudian contributions to the origin of leadership and the State are worthy of notice. Contributors to this field are Freud (33), Rivers (87), Kelsen (59), and Kolnai (61). A discussion of these tendencies is also given by Allport (5). Symbolization of the father by the leader, "libidinal fixation" resembling hypnotic suggestion between leader and followers, sublimation of thwarted sexual impulses into bonds of group affiliation, and regression to infantile utopian ideas are among the principal themes.

VI. PSYCHOLOGY IN RELATION TO SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

The culture problem has come to the fore through Ogburn's brilliant discussion of social change (76). Though recognizing psychology, this author states his laws of culture-dynamics (rate of change, accumulation, inertia, lag, etc.) from an inductive survey at the cultural level itself. Allport's criticism (2) alleges that this treatment is too much limited to description, explanation being possible only by considering the human individual (biological and psychological) as the unit of social change. The rôle of the individual has also been stressed, in respect to leadership, racial traits, capacity, and biological aspects, by Blackmar (15), Hankins (46), Chapin (24), and Huxley (51). But the strongest support has come from the anthropologist himself. Wissler (105) significantly asserts that culture is founded upon human behavior, which may be both innate and acquired. Although culture transmission may account for the *content* of the culture pattern (acquired behavior) in any people, it can not explain the *form* of that pattern, a form which is peculiar to mankind and universal among all races. Wissler's effort to link up the various complexes of the universal pattern with instinctive categories, though tentative, is nevertheless ingenious. Allport offers an explanation of the cultural trait-complexes through the universal operation of the prepotent responses (2, 4, 1).

Case (21) ascribes war to a combined instinctive and cultural causation. Culture patterns have been given a "mentalist" or "psychic" reference by Wallis (97) and Ellwood (30). A further discussion of the culture concept containing some socio-psychological definitions has been given by Case (22).

Folkways and customs characteristic of a group have been termed by Bartlett "group difference tendencies" (11). He considers them as the adequate bases for the popular acceptance of folk-tales and similar culture elements. Allport (3) maintains that this view overlooks the psychological (*i.e.*, individual) factors upon which the continuance of folkways itself depends. Faris (31) turns the tables again by showing how much the psychologist himself might learn from ethnology. Notwithstanding the over-petulant invectives of G. E. Smith (91, 92), Malinowski, a first-hand observer, has shown that, with some revision as to the nature of the "nuclear complex", Freud was essentially right in his interpretation of conflict and repression as forces underlying and explaining primitive social organization (65, 66). Though fraught with disputes and misunderstandings, the *liaison* between psychology and anthropology seems interesting and full of promise.

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CRIMINOLOGY

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Recent years have brought a skeptical attitude toward an earlier disposition to label criminals and juvenile delinquents with a single descriptive term. The common sense view that the individual and all the factors that play upon him through heredity and through his immediate surroundings are so vastly complex that no simple description is adequate, has apparently come into its own. In criminologic relations we are hearing less of "testers" and of a "mental test" and more of a diagnosis. There is more testing of tests than formerly. There are evidences that it is no longer in the best of taste to test or even to make a broad diagnosis of a group of delinquents or of criminals, and to let it go at that. Good form in scientific methodology calls out for a searching comparison, once a test or diagnosis of a delinquent group has been made, with a group of non-delinquents selected from a social and economic level that approximates to the corresponding level of the delinquent group. In this respect the development of scientific method here corresponds to that in other quarters.

"Mary, aged 15, has a mental age of nine years," is so absurdly simple a statement that it means nothing, probably even to the expert, excepting that there are certain types of things that Mary cannot do. A study of Mary's "quality" is required on top of the determination of her mental age as a preliminary to understanding what *positively* to do for her or with her (116). The determination of intelligence levels is a useful procedure (44) but its greatest value is negative. "No superstructure of useful adjustments can be built upon it" (54, 56).

The division of labor between the psychologist and the psychiatrist in the field of criminology has been a question for good natured dispute and no doubt it will continue to be so for some time to come. Perhaps no psychologist will recognize a clear boundary line but only areas in which he may bear down with greater emphasis and with less. Healy (56) believes that the psychologist has a right

to take a high place in relation to children because it is rare that out and out mental disease is found to be developed among them. Here the psychologist's special skill in arranging conditions for the development of habits and attitudes will stand him in especially good stead. But for this purpose we need the psychologist who is acquainted with the best in his own technical branch of science. The "get-rich-quick" variety does not belong here.

A study of nearly 1,000 prisoners in a New Jersey institution makes a comparison of these prisoners with 6,541 white draft recruits at Camp Dix, N. J. The distribution of letter grades makes this group identical with 1,500,000 recruits in the army as a whole.

The Army Alpha test was employed in examining the prisoners. Their practical illiteracy was found to be 3.6 per cent higher than in the army. The average score in the prison group is 15 points below that in the army as a whole. Seven per cent of the prisoners obtained scores equivalent to those of typical army officers (*i.e.*, above 105 points) while 13 per cent of recruits received such a score.

Disregarding the excessive proportion of negroes and low grade foreigners in the prison, the lowest 50 per cent of prisoners equals the lowest 40 per cent of recruits while the highest 10 per cent of prisoners do not exceed the highest 25 per cent of draft recruits. Altogether the intelligence of the prison population is somewhat below that of the recruits. But the army curve with which the comparison is made here represents a group containing no negroes (who grade lower than whites). But in the prison population 25 per cent are negroes and another 25 per cent are low grade foreigners. When allowance is made for selective influences on the basis of nationality and color the "mental constitution" of the prison corresponds very closely to the "average intelligence of adult males in the state as a whole" (30). The author of this study, Dr. Doll, with appropriate caution, disclaims that these results may be stated for prisoners everywhere. Selective influences are too widely divergent in different localities to allow such a claim.

Other studies in other localities may be said to substantiate these results. Dr. Stone, for example (111), believes that we have been subjecting our delinquents to more severe tests than the general population and that when correction is made at this point we can show no such disparity between the intelligence levels of the delinquent and the non-delinquent population as has been popularly believed to exist. Dr. Murchison (89) in an extended comparison of Alpha Army scores with those of delinquent groups makes it

appear more desirable to be a criminal than a non-criminal—if height of Alpha score may be taken as an index of desirability. For the criminal group, he finds, is superior to the white draft in the army, though less literate. Roving criminals are superior to stay-at-homes, and the reader is surprised to find the statement that recidivists are more intelligent than first offenders.

Women delinquents and non-delinquents compare quite as favorably as do corresponding groups among men according to Fernald, Hayes and Hawley (38). In an excellent example of detailed statistical work applied to social data they conclude that "even when we compare the delinquent group with the general population we find relatively slight distinctions and much overlapping."

Other comparisons of groups have been made within the period we are reviewing, notably by Vuillenmier between delinquents from city and country respectively (126). These studies point to no personal characteristics that distinguish one group from the other, but only to the fact that in the city crimes of violence to the person predominate over offenses against property, whereas the reverse is found for the country. This conclusion is likely open to question.

The results of comparing the intelligence levels of the delinquent and the normal groups being negative in character—or approximately so—investigators have naturally turned in other directions for a search after causes of criminality so far as may be found in the nature of the person, and to a new examination of our methods of research (97, 29). Personality traits other than intelligence, mental disease and social and economic factors also have come in for an enormous emphasis. Dr. Healy's showing of a practically normal distribution of intelligence among 1,212 juvenile delinquents in Boston (57) is a sufficient aggravation to lead away from intelligence levels of children, at any rate, in hunting the causes of criminality.

The diminished emphasis upon feebleness of mind as a cause of irregular conduct has been followed by an elaborate examination of emotional states (90). When the higher centers of control topple behavior becomes a riot. Consciousness is narrowed or lost temporarily and it is all blamed, in a last analysis, upon endocrinologic disturbances—which for all the evidence may be as much overworked as feeble-mindedness has been in the past.

"Personality" and "character", once almost discarded terms, have again come to the fore, but in a new dress and with a new meaning (37). With these revivals the interview has been coming

into its own once more. But the investigator is at pains to make it a controlled interview.

A study of some of the personality types that have proved to be of unusual importance in criminologic study (the paranoid, the defective delinquent, and the psychopathic criminal), has led the Illinois State Criminologist to urge commitment to the guardianship of the state; not to an institution. The delinquent or criminal should be classed as a minor until he shall have proven his capacity to manage his own affairs (2).

The causal conditions of criminality as they are interpreted, that have been brought to light by "personality" studies are often of an insidious nature. Their seriousness is not easily recognized excepting by the initiated. Larson and Walker (74), from a background of practical police work, have discussed *Paranoia* and *Paranoid Personalities* and have shown that the chronic complainant—a character well known among police officials—belongs in this category. In the matter of treating such persons they go farther than many others would go at the present time and recommend that in hearings regarding lunacy a board of psychiatrists should sit as a substitute for a lay jury. But first of all the police must be so trained that they may recognize these characters when they find them. District attorneys and judiciary bodies also must be brought into a knowledge of such cases as a part of their professional training. The authors believe that all this will be of enormous practical value because it will greatly facilitate, not only finding these highly potential criminals but segregating them and thus affording the community the protection it justifiably expects.

Most chronic complainants may be suffering from some form of compulsion neurosis and the earlier they are recognized the better for all concerned. There are several descriptions in the literature of recent date of notorious instances of compulsion neuroses and their direful consequences. "The case of J. P. Watson, the Modern Bluebeard," reported by Hoag and Williams, is in point (62). This murderer of at least five wives was perhaps a victim of epilepsy and of sex perversion—judging from his elation after a killing. And Dr. Haines' account of a "Feeble-minded Homicide" (49) is of the same order save that it is alleged of this thirty-seven-year old homicide that he is but five years and nine months old mentally. Considerable retardation! Curiously this character had so much appreciation of social situations that the jury considered him legally responsible for crime. No doubt it would be in accordance with the

vogue to-day to hypothesize emotional disturbances and compulsion neurosis in his case.

Spencer, Czolgoz and Richeson belong to the group of mentally unstable according to the view of Dr. Briggs (13). The compulsion neurosis is only one of manifold manifestations of instability and Dr. Briggs contends that the character of these creatures could have been recognized very early in their lives and that their instinctive forces might have been guided into a useful and happy way. To say so with respect to the three distinguished murderers mentioned above may be much of a pious wish; for psychiatry has probably made considerable strides since they flourished.

Descriptions of cases such as these are good advertisements of the psychiatric clinic, and the converse is true too, if the clinic can be said to be *advertising* the weakling by bringing him to light. But the clinic has in recent years got beyond the need of the exceptional case to exploit it. In prison, in courts and in the community without relation to such institutions, the clinic is performing a social service by discovering many who are unstable and by aiding other agencies such as the home and the school to fortify them (6).

A notable illustration of the clinic in action is found in the Recorder's Court in Detroit. A report on 1,988 offenders who had passed through the institution is illuminating (99). It shows a "high rate of psychiatric and phrenic deviation" and a "high incidence of recidivism".

The ingenuity of the clinicians would have been strained to the utmost the day before the Franks murder in Chicago to discover Loeb and Leopold as the psychiatrists for the defense found them in the course of the trial. The chances are that the boys would have been overlooked in the succession of numerous cases. But while the trial was on we were told of the conflict between their "phantasy and their real life" of repression and of the "misplacement of their emotions" of their "abnormal urge toward activity of their dis-integrated personalities" all leading to the conclusion that the murderers were "thoroughly unbalanced in their mental lives." At least this was asserted of Leopold. As to Loeb there was a "manifest split between his intellectual and emotional life". He is of "pathological mind" (134). A "split" between individual or "clinical" psychology and social psychology is as prominent as a mountain in the contribution of the defense psychiatrists to this strange case. At least this is the view of many competent students. That the merest hypothesis received the emphasis of solid fact is all too evi-

dent. The psychiatrists for the prosecution did not find what the others discovered and the judge ignored both and took cognizance only of the youthfulness of the offenders" (35).

This called forth the pertinent remark from Dean Wigmore that the boundary between minority and legal age is only an arbitrary thing of convenience like a meridian and that it has as little relation to character as has an equator (35, 117). A brief symposium of comments upon the case by members of the legal profession is published in the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*. With the possible exception of Judge Olson, who stresses emotional defect in the defendants, they recognize what appears to them the complete responsibility of the defendants. And Dean Wigmore trenchantly describes the language of the defense psychiatrists as that of Biology, "sheer determinism". If there is a noxious weed in the garden you cut it down. You do not spare it because it is its nature to be a weed. The measures of modern penal law are based on social self-defense; and penalties inflicted by the law do deter others, he urges, from committing offenses. Thus social self-defense is secured. In support of this view he cites the language of delinquent juveniles: "They can't hang us now because we aren't of age." "Let psychiatrists help criminals through the situation, by all means, but as advisers to the criminal court their determinism is out of place" (135). The morale of a community is the greatest bulwark of social self-defense and this morale is weakened by the doctrine of determinism in the criminal court because it runs toward mitigation of punishment (40). The "constructive way" of approaching a criminal trial and the specialization among judges (133) that some psychiatrists urge is a look away from the interest in the morale of the group toward the individual more narrowly considered. Here is the gap between social and individual psychology that ought to be bridged.

The plea of guilty in the Leopold-Loeb case followed by the introduction of psychiatric testimony by way of mitigation of punishment has led to an argument by S. S. Glueck to the effect that "if the law recognized degrees of responsibility and permitted the jury to accept evidence of mental disorder insufficient to prove complete irresponsibility as 'measured' by the 'tests' but sufficient to permit the jury to find a less degree of offense than would be the case when no such evidence was introduced, then resort to the plea of guilty and introduction of psychiatric testimony by way of mitigation would not be necessary" (42). If psychiatry touches man "in

his social integrations" (131) and if this is its genius it would appear that the psychiatrist would find therein a hindrance to stressing the form of deterministic view that aroused Wigmore's opposition.

Apropos of the prevalent attitude favorable to the mitigation of punishment, once mental defect has been demonstrated, it is noteworthy that Goddard, whose professional history might be supposed to bias him in that direction, has acknowledged the efficacy in "certain situations at any rate" of severe punishment once responsibility has been clearly demonstrated. This position he takes, presumably, on the ground that there is a reëducative value in such punishment (46), on the other hand Hollingworth (65) has little confidence in the effectiveness of reëducation in relation to the psychoneurotic.

Classification of the causes of crime are bound to be grossly inaccurate for the reason that "causes" are always exceedingly complicated (138). Dr. Healy is giving a splendid illustration of the fact in his "Studies from the Judge Baker Foundation" (55). Each case is described in a separate pamphlet at length; a protest against the apparent belief, now less to the fore than formerly, that a few signs can give an adequate perspective of delinquent behavior (27). This point has been emphasized by Professor Burt also in his report upon a study of 200 cases (15).

A classification for the use of institutions for the care of criminals and delinquents has been prepared by Dr. Pollock (96). The mental status he considers the most important guide to such a classification. The system suggested by the American Medico-Psychological Association for the Study of the Feeble-minded in 1920 served as a guide in preparing the forms that Dr. Pollock published with this article.

Studies on the relations of narcotic drugs and crime have emphasized what had already been fully recognized by the medical and psychological profession, at least, that drug addiction is essentially a neuropsychiatric problem (130). At the same time it is a social problem. The drug clinic has apparently proven to be a failure as a mechanism for control (109). Dr. Santoz has made an admirable report on the subject to the Municipal Court in Boston (104). He writes from a psychological and a medico-legal standpoint and recommends a policy of severity on the part of the courts in dealing with criminals who are victims of addiction to narcotic drugs. This recommendation looks not so much toward a beneficiary effect upon the victim, as toward its social effect. The exercise of severity will draw public attention to the prevalence of addiction and through this avenue, he believes, it will bring relief.

A medico-legal case described by Dr. Tucker (119) illustrates the possibilities of surgical aid in certain types of cases. An external hydrocephalic victim of wanderlust, pyromania and kleptomania was improved by the expedient of draining the cerebrospinal fluid from within the dura out from under the temporal muscles where it was absorbed. The patient's insight into his past condition became excellent and his conduct is described as exemplary.

The general principles of medico-legal thought and work and the problems of risks, jeopardy and responsibility for carelessness are discussed at length by Zangger (139).

The management of a prison population is of perennial interest. The potential labor within the walls of penal institutions has for a long time directed attention to the possibility of administering them without creating a drain upon public funds (108). But the difficulties attendant upon the administration of labor *within* the walls are very great. This is especially true when the prisoners are women. Mrs. Hodder, Superintendent of the Reformatory for Women at Framingham, Mass., is attempting an experiment in the indenture of prisoners whose offenses range from drunkenness to manslaughter (63). Some of them are normal, others are psychopathic and still others are feeble-minded. A daring experiment by a skilled experimenter!

In the department of police Chief Vollmer of Berkeley and his lieutenants are blazing the way of scientific work with unabated zeal. Research by men trained on the methods of science and of the development of adequate criminal statistics is the watchword of Vollmer (122). He sketches the evolution of the criminal record (125). He draws upon his wide experience and rare attainments for suggestions as to the classification of crimes and of criminals: a classification in which psychological factors loom large. His suggestions as to the proper contents of criminal statistics are particularly valuable now when the whole subject has been brought again to the fore by Professor Warner (127).

The selection of police officials has not gone unnoticed. An aptitude test for policemen seems to have been carefully devised and applied by Martin (84). A group of officers were rated on the basis of appearance, intelligence, discipline and efficiency. The ratings were made by four superior officers. Their correlation was 0.84. There was an analysis of the policeman's job. It is regulative, investigational and informational. On this basis certain mental traits were deemed to be essential in a successful officer, and eleven tests were employed that were deemed fit to reveal these traits.

Of somewhat different nature is Vollmer's adaptation of the Army tests to the selection of policemen and of supplementary tests to discover special aptitudes to guide the chief in placement within the department.

But perhaps the most interesting adventure in relation to the work of the police is Marston's development of deception tests by means of the systolic blood pressure (83). The average percentage of correct judgments by fourteen untrained observers who employed the test was high. Cases are described. The writer does not conclude, however, that the courts-martial or military intelligence officers should rely solely upon the results of the tests when they are operated by non-experts. But he believes they are absolutely reliable in the hands of well trained persons and he is certain that their use is fully justified in the probation office procedure.

This test has been modified by Larson in the School for Police in Berkeley (75). Instead of feeling the pulse he employed a stethoscope and he took a pneumographic record simultaneously with the blood pressure. The time and exact moment of asking questions were recorded separately upon two drums. Questions relating to the alleged offense were presented in printed form upon a rotating drum. By the aid of this apparatus Dr. Larson has cleared up a puzzling case of theft.

There is no let-up of interest in eugenics. Dr. Holmes has done a great service by publishing an extended bibliography (68). It is not only for the improvement of the race but for the prevention of crime that segregation and sterilization should go hand in hand (11, 76).

There are nearly a thousand pages in the two volumes of proceedings of the Congress on Eugenics in New York in 1921. Differential fecundity, inbreeding, special strains, control of human matings, family traits in relation to social conditions, relation of eugenics to racial, economic and social problems such as immigration, race mingling, population, marriage, parenthood, sterilization, disease and education, a catalogue of a comprehensive program of papers and addresses.

The preparation of a social background or atmosphere through general and special education that will minister toward the prevention of crime will always quite properly occupy a large place in the public thought. This has already been referred to in connection with the Leopold-Loeb case. With this in view Cox has made a new departure in preparing a text in ethics (23). It is his aim to

teach ethics by the case method; and he has drawn upon court situations for his material. Unfortunately the examples of conduct he employs are restricted in scope, elemental, and they lack subtlety in the moral situation. But the book is a case of pioneering in a most wholesome direction; that of forming the mind of the general student.

The training for the public profession of the law (100)—to speak of special education—could take profit, as Justice Villamor of the Philippines urges (121), from a post-graduate course in criminology and medical jurisprudence. But this is written, not with a view to bolstering the morale of the profession but with an eye to the preparation of jurists to handle the testimony of medical experts.

Criminal law has certain societal aspects: they are economic, sociologic, psychologic and philosophic (78). The law must be administered with regard to them. It is probably the recognition of this fact that has led to the socialization of court procedure, to enlarging the police power to secure the general welfare and to the creation of new tribunals to perform community obligations. It has led also to the serious question how far court procedure can be socialized without impairing individual rights (129).

The discussion of these matters on the part of the most active thinkers in the legal profession is possible only because a multitude of more or less careful analyses of social problems have gradually taken hold of members of the bar. Serious discussion of criminal responsibility is rooted in the same soil. The best of the bar recognizes that the ancient legal tests of responsibility rest upon medical theories that are now obsolete (73, 87) and with which the scientific knowledge of the present day is in sharp conflict. Professor Keedy is responsible for a measure that does away with the legal definition of insanity. The medical witness will testify as to the mental condition of the defendant at the time he committed the act with which he is charged. The judge will then describe to the jury the mental element involved in the crime as charged, and the jury will decide whether the defendant as a result of the mental condition portrayed by the witness had the mental state as described by the judge.

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SPECIAL REVIEWS

RIVERS, W. H. R. *Medicine, Magic, and Religion*. N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace, 1924. Pp. viii+147.

In 1915 and 1916 Rivers delivered the Fitz Patrick Lectures in London but delayed their publication in book form with the intention of writing at leisure a comprehensive treatise on *Primitive Medicine*. Death frustrated his purpose; and G. Elliott Smith has now brought out these lectures, together with a later one (1919) on *Mind and Medicine*. Thus we have here, in the words of the author, certain prolegomena to the early history of medicine. The chief aim of the book is, "by means of relations between medicine, magic, and religion, to illustrate the principles and methods which should guide and direct the study of the history of social institutions" (55).

The first chapter treats of the relation of medicine to magic, and the second of the relation of medicine to religion. The term religion is defined, satisfactorily as it seems to the reviewer, in such a way as to make rites of supplication and propitiation its characteristic mark. The sentence, "Religion differs from magic in that it involves the belief in some power in the universe greater than that of man himself" (4), is, however, confusing. When writing it, the author seems to have lost sight of what is obviously for him the essential difference between magic and religion. That difference is not one of the "greatness" of the powers involved, but of their nature; it is a difference in the *nature* of the means by which man seeks to influence the animate or inanimate world about him. Coercing spirits of gods or any other agent is magic, whatever or whoever the agent using the coercitive power may be; while making an anthropopathic appeal to these spirits or gods (*i.e.*, supplicating, propitiating, and the like), is religion. The difficulties which may be encountered in disentangling, in any particular ceremony, these two different processes does not do away with their fundamental difference.

Among savage peoples the causation and the cure of disease is usually understood in a magical or a religious way. When a man is killed by a branch falling from a tree or in battle, the event is put to the account of a sorcerer who is accused of having timed the fall of the branch or of having guided the missile so as to encompass his end.

According to the savage there are three causes of disease: "those

in which some morbid object or substance is projected into the body of the victim; those in which something is abstracted from the body; and those in which the sorcerer acts on some part of the body of a person or on some object which has been connected with the body of a person." These three classes are considered in detail.

A very close connection exists in Melanesia and elsewhere between disease and taboo, itself belonging to the cult of the dead. We are told that, for instance, in the little island of Eddystone, where the author spent several months, nearly every disease is ascribed to the infraction of a taboo on the fruit of certain trees. In the curative rites the religious element is obvious: "the note of supplication runs through all the formulas."

There are, however, also a great many disorders—the minor and more ordinary ailments, which do not endanger life—the cause of which is regarded as neither magical nor religious. They are said to come of themselves and do not require for treatment the aid of any specialized practitioner. Rivers remarks that it cannot be concluded that these disorders are regarded as having a "natural" cause. Nevertheless, he records that there is in Africa a widespread belief in the production of disease by natural causes, and a genuine art of medicine, especially among the Bantu peoples (70, 72).

Thus the consideration of the causes ascribed to disease by the savage and of his methods of cure, brings out an intimate connection between three sets of processes (magical, religious, and "natural") which are clearly separated by the civilized. And the curative practices appear not as a medley of disconnected and meaningless customs but as quite rational: "Their modes of treatment follow directly from their ideas concerning etiology and pathology" (51). If a person has fallen sick because a part of his soul has been abstracted by some sorcerer, the cure is to be effected by getting hold of, and restoring that part to the sufferer. When lack of consistency appears, it is due to a mixture of different cultures that have not been unified.

The second half of the book (Chaps. III and IV, pp. 55-117) is an historical and evolutionary treatment. It is devoted mainly to a consideration of the mechanism by which the relation between medicine, magic, and religion has come into being. Here the author meets the two theories which still divide the students of Culture. They may be roughly expressed thus: (1) the same cultural traits have originated in different places at different times; (2) diffusion of cultural traits has taken place from one center to various parts of the earth. The influence of G. Elliot Smith and W. J. Perry of Manchester

University upon Rivers is in evidence. He has now come to realize very clearly the serious difficulties in the way of the independent-origin hypothesis and has perceived something of the plausibility of the theory of these men who look to Egypt as the origin of a vast complex of culture-features which have spread to almost every part of the earth (57).

After a brief survey of the relations of medicine, magic, and religion, in various countries, the conclusion is reached that although great similarities exist all over the earth "in the general character of the beliefs concerning the causation of disease" (76), differences such as the following are nevertheless observed: the production of disease by the abstraction of the soul or part of the soul appears to be limited to Indonesia, Papuo-Melanesia, and America. India and Africa, on the other hand, are preëminently the seat of the belief in the production of disease by possession. It seems to the author difficult to account on the basis of the independent origin of diseases (which are everywhere about the same) for these differences, and still more difficult to explain the coexistence of beliefs so far different where, as in North America, they are found together.

The difficulties which the independent origin theory has to face become well nigh insuperable when one considers the remedies of the domestic order, the "natural" remedies. The lowly Papuans practice five modes of treatment found widely distributed over the earth: poulticing, blood-letting, massage, vapor-bath, and counter irritation. And "these practices stand apart from the system of therapeutics based on the belief in the production of disease by human or spirit agency which bulks so largely in the minds of the people" (83). When we recall that we ourselves have acquired, not discovered, these practices, each from a different source (bleeding from the Greeks and Arabs, vapor-bath from the Turks and Russians, etc.), it becomes impossible to credit the Papuans with the independent invention of these several forms of treatment.

In chapter IV is formulated a principle for the guidance of the student of the history and evolution of Culture, and several interesting illustrations of its workings are given. The principle reads: "Transplanted elements of culture tend to take root in a new home in so far as they are in harmony with the physical and cultural nature of their new environment, and, if they succeed in taking root, tend to become modified in the direction of the indigenous culture by which they are assimilated" (92).

With regard to the methods used in the treatment of disease,

Rivers hopes to have shown that the hypothesis of independent origin "furnishes a very inadequate explanation of the wide distribution of these practices," but he is aware that he has "not been able to bring forward any absolutely conclusive evidence in favor of transmission, nor, when transmission seems probable, . . . any one movement of mankind as its vehicle" (108). His object has been "mainly to suggest problems and consider the principles which we must follow in attempting their solution." None, it seems to the reviewer, will be inclined to deny that that task has been successfully performed.

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BERNARD, L. L. *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology*. N. Y.: Holt, 1924. Pp. 550.

If the author called his book on instinct a study in social psychology, it is evidently not because its content closely resembles that of other books on social psychology, but because he believed that an acceptance of his point of view would alter materially the development of social theory and social policy. He draws attention to the fact that although almost all those who write about social and educational psychology begin with analyses of the instincts, nevertheless, when they come to the constructive parts of their writings these analyses and the principles derived from them are mostly abandoned. In Bernard's opinion, these authors start with instincts because they believe not only that the instincts underlie all of the complex developments of social and individual life but also that they are the principal factors determining the direction of these developments. And, if later on, they disregard their early discussions, it is because they find that their results are not helpful in a treatment of the educative process and of the organizations of social life; for, the "instincts" discussed by these authors are really acquired habit-complexes which are determined very little by the reflexes, real instincts, and random movements out of which the so-called "instincts" arise, but are determined largely by the psycho-social environment in response to which they develop. Therefore the author believes that social and educational psychologists should primarily study the mechanisms by which the citizen and the child build up their habits on the basis of their instincts and the way they transform one habit, or one set of habits, into another.

The book will probably not be as useful to psychologists as it might be because so much of it consists of an attack on the concepts of instinct held by writers in other fields and by popular writers in psychology. Thus, because Mr. C. B. Davenport speaks of an "instinct of criminality," we find the whole thirteenth chapter devoted to a painstaking analysis and criticism of that alleged instinct. We also find that chapters VII, VIII, and IX, which the author himself believes to "contain the major portions of the concrete results of the investigation" consist of an analysis of the usage of the term instinct by 412 writers, including Milton, Zola, Mark Twain, and the *Minneapolis Daily Journal*. In chapter IV he makes an "attempt to establish a definition of instinct sanctioned by the most authoritative contributions to the subject as a point of departure for the remainder of the book." This chapter quotes the definitions of the leading psychologists and also those of Veblen, Trotter, and of *The New Standard Dictionary*, and then makes much of the fact that these definitions do not all agree. The only definition which he himself gives is the following: "An instinct is an inborn (in the sense of inherited) activity process which has remained intact, that is, which has not been remade through the process of learning or of making new adjustments by means of the substitution of new stimuli or responses for the old which was inherited" (p. 84). With only a few exceptions he adheres to this one-sided point of view and insists that an instinct-habit complex should always be called a habit and in no sense an instinct. On the basis of this definition he proceeds to criticize various views to show that even the writers who "define instinct properly, as an inherited automatism, or stimulus-response process, . . . deviate from their definition in their actual usage." One may therefore be surprised to find in the midst of this criticism the following statements: "The vocal responses to the child's cries—the responses of the mother as well as the cries of the child *which are instinctive*—apparently have in their native form merely the power to produce useful movements or silence or vocal action in the offspring or to frighten off the enemies of the child. Silence produced by soothing monotony in the mother's voice or by the shock from the shrillness of her cries may have survival value for the child. The young of some animals scurry hastily to cover upon hearing the mother give a certain signal, which is evidently effective because of its emotional significance. Other signals call the young to partake of food" (*italics mine*. P. 330). And a little further on we find him speaking of "instinctive forward movement and fondling caresses

of the mother in response to the cry of the child". Many psychologists would hesitate to agree with him that there is no learned element in the child's useful movements or silence or vocal action in response to the stimulus of the mother's cries, or that the mother's fondling movements or her approach to the child when it cries are wholly instinctive and not in any sense learned. He seems to have fallen into the same error which he criticizes, *i.e.*, calling "instincts" those responses which consist in instincts modified by learning.

For Professor Bernard's thesis is that the activities usually called instincts, such as the maternal instinct, reproductive instinct, gregarious instinct, are really not instincts at all but rather habit-complexes, determined primarily by the pressure of the psycho-social environment; that the real instincts are some hundreds or even thousands of inherited mechanisms, including reflexes, which do not usually function independently but are organized into larger habit complexes under the pressure of the psycho-social environment; and that the nature of these complexes is primarily determined by that environment and not by the nature of the instincts out of which they are formed. This thesis he develops in four ways, first by a study of the phylogenetic development of the nervous system, second by an examination of the current usage of the term instinct, third by a brief examination of the nature of heredity, and fourth by a study of certain specific instincts to show that they are really habit complexes.

In his first line of argument the author states that the autonomic nervous system is the most primitive nervous system and the one principally involved in the reflex and instinctive acts: "Because of its early origin and its simple and highly standardized or fixed functions in promoting and conserving the vital processes, more definitely inherited processes or connections are found in this autonomic system than in the remainder of the nervous organization. This is the true and original home of the reflexes, instincts and tropisms" (p. 45). Later in the development of the race appears the cerebrospinal system and especially the cerebral cortex, which he calls "primarily a habit or acquired system," and which "has come in the more advanced human epoch to be under the dominance of man's psycho-social environment, which we call civilization." He claims that with the development of this cerebral cortex the controlling function ceased to be inherited and instinctive and became acquired and habitual. The whole force of this argument depends on whether one grants his

premise that the instincts are localized principally in the autonomic system. No argument is offered in support of this position.

Professor Bernard next proceeds to a study of the current usage of the term instinct to show the variety in that usage and the general lack of critical standards. He quotes in chapter VIII the classifications of instincts made by a number of psychologists, criticizing them because they overlap and because they give no method or power of distinguishing between the elements which are inherited and those which are acquired. In chapters VII and IX he presents the results of an analysis of the works of more than six hundred contemporary writers to ascertain the usage of the term instinct. As might be expected he finds the greatest lack of agreement and standardization. He reports 5,759 different classes of instincts, mentioned by 412 different authors, in 495 different books, and totaling 14,046 separate cases. Chapter VII begins oddly enough with a criticism of the use of instinct in Milton's "Chariot instinct with fire" and Wordsworth's "genius instinct with music," and fifteen like examples. Surely the author does not know that "instinct" may be used as an adjective meaning merely "imbued, animated, alive," or he would never have criticized these authors for "an unscientific use of the term . . . usually confined to the litterateurs untrained in the scientific terminology of psychology."

Most of the third line of argument offered by Professor Bernard in support of his thesis proceeds from a consideration of the nature of biological inheritance: Nothing could be inherited which was not determined in the chromosome structure of the reproductive cells of the parents of the individual in question, and nothing could be so determined which was not a structural organization. Would not an insistence on this simple principle do away with much of the incorrect usage of the term instinct?

The fourth and perhaps the strongest argument of the author is contained in chapters XIII to XVI where he analyzes certain so-called instincts, the instinct of criminality, maternal instinct, play, fighting, and others. He does not seem to be aware that his list contains some "instincts" which few, if any, psychological authorities would recognize as instincts. He shows that several of these examples are confused mixtures of inherited and acquired traits. Each of them is an aggregate of many totally different responses to many totally different stimuli, which cannot possibly be formed into a neuromuscular unity and therefore cannot have a unit biological character; they must have been formed into a unity by the pressure of the psycho-social environ-

ment because they are somewhat alike in their results when viewed socially and morally. He claims further that exactly the same acts often enter into several so-called instincts; for instance of the many acts performed in play, some are like those performed in fighting, and others are like those performed in construction. The author argues that this condition is inexplicable if fighting, play, construction, and so forth, must be considered hereditary units, but easily explicable if they are acquired complexes, for then it is only necessary to assume that there are certain unit-movements of hand, of wrist, or arm, of body, of eye, of voice, which are hereditary, and that these are organized through a learning process which is guided by the needs of the psycho-social environment into various forms of activity. In the last two chapters Professor Bernard attempts to prove that the affective life is not predominantly instinctive.

In so far as the author of this book merely points out acquired elements in all so-called instincts, he is adding nothing new to our understanding, for all psychologists would doubtless agree that after earliest infancy in man and in the other higher animals there are few, if any, "pure" instincts, wholly unmodified by experience. In so far as he insists that in accounting for these habits, built up on a basis of reflexes and instincts, more emphasis should be placed on the environment and particularly on the psycho-social environment he is doubtless correct; and in so far as he suggests that social and educational psychology should give up their preoccupation with instincts and find their starting-point in an analysis of the learning and habit forming processes and in an investigation of the way in which the psycho-social environment, the customs and culture which man has built up, form and modify all the reactions of each new individual born into this society, he has pointed out a possibly more fruitful path for them to follow. But in so far as he implies that these reflexes and instincts and random movements, on the basis of which the complexes so often called instincts are built, are themselves absolutely unimportant and insignificant, he is falling into the extreme position that man is at birth a mere tabula rasa, that particular individuals and particular races are wholly plastic to the pressure of the psycho-social environment—a position to which even those who are not extreme instinctivists will probably object.

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LEUBA, JAMES H. *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trübner. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925.

The literature of mysticism produced by our century is already reaching formidable proportions. A large part of it is devoted to what is called the "psychology" of mysticism. Judging from the mass of these works we ought by this time to have a rather exhaustive knowledge of the psychology of the mystics. As a matter of fact, it must be said of the considerable majority of the writers involved that their acquaintance with the mystics has been limited and their acquaintance with psychology has been minimal. In our days psychology is a word to conjure with; and the conjurers have been many. As so often happened in the days of magic, they have raised a spirit which they do not understand and which they can not control.

The writers who have treated of mysticism in a manner that can truly be called psychological in the exact and modern sense of that word could be numbered on one's fingers. For years Professor Leuba has been prominent among these few; and it is hardly too much to say that his most recent contribution to this field has made him primary among them. Back in 1902 he wrote for the *Revue Philosophique* two long articles on the "*Tendances Fondamentales des Mystiques Chrétiens*," which the more serious students of the subject at once recognized as containing perhaps the most careful and exact psychological analysis of the mystic consciousness that had yet appeared. As a result of the promise given by these articles and by his two books, "A Psychological Study of Religion" (1912) and "The Belief in God and Immortality" (1916), students of the psychology of religion as a serious and scientific pursuit have eagerly been looking forward to the appearance of the present work; and in the opinion of the reviewer at any rate, the book amply fulfills these high anticipations. Professor Leuba's reading of the literature of mysticism has been wide and careful. He is, as everyone knows, an experienced professional psychologist. And what he writes about mysticism is neither theology nor philosophy nor poetry, but psychology in the exact sense of that term.

The book begins (after an introductory chapter) with an analysis of mystical ecstasy as produced by drugs and other physical means; and this is followed by a chapter on the Yoga system of mental concentration and the mystical experiences resulting therefrom. With the results of these studies in mind, showing as they do the sort of

thing that can be produced by purely physical and psychical methods, he proceeds in the chapters that follow to examine in detail the facts of Christian mysticism. The author's purpose is to show that *considered as psychical phenomena*, the mystical ecstasy, trance-consciousness, etc., do not differ in anything essential from the non-religious phenomena studied in the introductory chapters. Professor Leuba is at pains to point out that Christian mysticism does differ enormously from drug-mysticism and Yoga mysticism in moral motivation, in interpretation, and in the uses to which it is put. But from the point of view of immediate and analyzable character and of psychological causation, the same general principles (in his opinion) hold for both.

Most of the cases of mysticism studied are drawn from the great mystics and are therefore of the rather extreme type. But the milder forms of mysticism also receive some attention, notably the "sense of presence." In fact, one of the best pieces of psychological analysis in the book is the analysis of this sense of invisible presence and divine guidance. Much the same might be said of the author's treatment of illumination and inspiration, religious, artistic, and scientific. Both inspiration and the sense of presence are analyzed into their elements, causally explained, and related to non-religious and non-marvelous experiences, some of which are matters of common knowledge, some of which Professor Leuba has been able to bring about by experimental methods in his laboratory.

There are several points of special interest to the technical student of the psychology of religion which in a longer review than this should have special treatment. There is, for example, room for much discussion over the place assigned to sex in the mystical consciousness. Although Professor Leuba is very far indeed from attributing to sex the exaggerated importance which many writers on religion give it, he is convinced that a great deal of the joy of the mystic ecstasy is to be explained by it and that "many of the curious phenomena to which most of the great mystics owe in part their fame are due to perturbations of the sex function consequent upon its repression." This position he expounded back in 1902, in the *Revue Philosophique* articles and in the present work he retains and elaborates the view. His thesis is that "there exists a connexion between the emotions of affection and the sexual activity; and that the sex organs may be aroused to a considerable degree without the person becoming aware of their participation." The last section of this thesis is essential to the identification of the joys of ecstasy with "intense attacks of erotomania"

in women mystics who, though they had had long experience of married life, failed to recognize anything sexual in the ecstasy. To validate his thesis Professor Leuba at times extends the word sex so as to include almost as much as the Freudian *libido*. The critic might be tempted to ask whether in so doing Professor Leuba has not proved too much. If mysticism is sexual only in the same sense as is all bodily pleasure, is it significant to call it sexual at all? It is only fair, however, to add that in most passages Professor Leuba means something much more specific by the word. And he is undoubtedly justified in tracing a part of the ecstatic delight to a sexual origin.

There are two points on which Professor Leuba dissents from the views of Delacroix, who is perhaps his most able predecessor in the field of the psychology of mysticism. He fails to find the regular rhythms of the mystic life (to which Delacroix devoted so much exposition in his great work) and he insists that the final stage of the great mystics was not of the passive and automatic sort that Delacroix had described. Lack of space forbids discussion here of these nice points, and the reviewer can only register his own conclusion that on both these matters Professor Leuba is absolutely right.

As has been indicated, the aim of this book and its method are primarily psychological. But in discussing a field so central to religion and to the philosophy of religion, it is, of course, impossible for the author to avoid recognizing the philosophical implications of his conclusions. It is probably on these by-products of his book that Professor Leuba will receive the greatest amount of criticism. Particularly will discussion center on his distinction between the immediately given and the mystic's interpretation of it. One may well ask, is the given ever so pure as to be free from all interpretation? Is not interpretation in some sense a part of the given? Are not all percepts "sign-facts"? And if this is so, is the matter so simple as Professor Leuba seems to suppose? Lack of space prevents a discussion here of these interesting questions. It should, however, be pointed out, in anticipation of the attacks the book will probably receive, that Professor Leuba is by no means unappreciative of the value of mysticism in its milder forms, nor unsympathetic with the great mystics—for whom, in fact, he manifests at times a great admiration. And the severest of his theological critics, it is to be hoped, will at any rate recognize his scientific honesty and his loyalty to the truth as he sees it.

JAMES BISSETT PRATT

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SUTHERLAND, E. H. *Criminology*. Phila.: Lippincott, 1924. Pp. 643.

Written as a volume in Lippincott's Sociological Series, the present text is an elaborately documented survey of present knowledge and opinions as to the effects, causes, treatment and prevention of crime. Some 450 different writers and investigators in fields related to these topics are cited.

The Introductory chapter presents criminology as a subdivision of social psychology. "Human nature is a group phenomenon, not merely an individual phenomenon. Crime and all the social policies connected with crime belong to this field of human nature. . . . Consequently it is essential to have a fundamental science of human nature in order to control such policies effectively" (p. 27).

Reservations with respect to the psychiatric approach to criminology are expressed by Sutherland. He deprecates "unilateral explanations such as those of the economic determinists, and of some eugenists and psychiatrists" (p. 27). He points out that "it is frequently reported that a specific part of the criminal population is found, on examination, to be psychopathic, and that this trait is therefore extremely important in the causation of crime. But no one knows how large a percentage of the general population would also be found, by the same tests, to be psychopathic. The logic is identical with that of an investigator who might find that 60 per cent of the prisoners had blue eyes and assert that blueness of eyes is an extremely important cause of crime" (p. 80). He classifies mental disorders into (a) psychoses, (b) intellectual deficiency, (c) epilepsy, "and perhaps (d) the psychopathies" (p. 124).

He does not, however, disregard psychopathic causes of crime. We read, for instance, on page 121:

"The attempt to suppress any tendency entirely, frequently produces a conflict between the tendency and the inhibition that may influence personality in most important respects. Healy has made a distinct contribution in his analysis of mental conflicts in connection with delinquencies, and cites many cases of delinquents whose difficulties can be traced to this condition. Some of the most difficult cases have been quickly modified when the source of the difficulty was discovered. The conflict seems to appear most frequently in connection with sex tendencies, but are not limited to them."

Pertinent criticisms of shortcomings in the application of statistical methods to the study of crime are presented. The lack of any dependable index of the prevalence of crime is pointed out. Of

Laughlin's *Analysis of America's Melting Pot*, he says, "In general this study is quite misleading in its conclusions because of the failure to take account of differences in composition and distribution" (p. 99). This criticism might well have been more severe.

Yet, admitting fully the present defective and rudimentary condition of criminological statistics, the reviewer cannot follow the author in his attitude toward the utility of the statistical method in determining the causes of crime. He urges: "that we should have information that will enable us to state that a person with such and such a nature or such and such attitudes in such and such a situation will always become delinquent. Perhaps it will never be possible to construct such laws, but it is certain that the statistics of traits of criminals will not carry us very far in that direction" (p. 82).

One need not reject the services of vital statistics because they do not predict just which individuals will succumb to typhoid, influenza, or smallpox. Why then set up impossible standards for criminal statistics?

Sutherland proposes individual case study as the method of arriving at scientific conclusions. He holds that "the methods differ, not in that one is statistical and the other one not statistical, but in that the individual is the unit in one, and the abstracted trait or condition is the unit in the other" (p. 82).

To the statistician this is a perplexing statement. Miss Anne Morrison, psychologist at the Slayton Farm for delinquent girls, advises me that 62 per cent of the 340 girls admitted to that institution in 1922 and 1923 had Stanford-Binet intelligence quotients of 75 or under, as compared with less than 3 per cent among the 905 unselected children tested by Terman. Subject to certain reservations in interpretation, these data suggest that mental deficiency enters prominently into the causal chain resulting in commitment of girls to this institution. In this comparison the unit of enumeration is the child, and these units are classified in accordance with certain traits. In what way would the author propose to change the procedure? If he means to propose the analysis of several different traits at the same time, how would he modify the statistical procedures of partial association or partial correlation which have been devised for dealing with just such problems? He says (pp. 82-84): "The comparison might be expressed better, however, if it is recalled that the purpose of the comparison of home-indices of criminals and non-criminals is to determine the importance of home conditions of specified kinds in producing delinquency; while the purpose of the individual case

study is to determine how and why certain types of homes produce delinquency, how they produce delinquency rather than how frequently they produce delinquency. . . . On the basis of such studies of the traits and situations of the delinquent, an effort is made to select the ones that *seem to be instrumental* in producing the delinquency" (*italics mine*).

This sort of analysis apparently consists simply in the application of common sense interpretations to more or less systematic observations. Such procedure is immensely valuable as a preliminary to more accurate definition of variables and to statistical analysis of their relationships; indeed statistics cannot proceed fruitfully except in coöperation with commonsense formulation of hypotheses. Yet it must always be remembered that these cruder methods are open to a great variety of dangers in the way of bias, hazy definitions of terms, generalization from inadequate data, and other logical fallacies. Statistics is a technique calculated, if properly used, to safeguard reasoning from some of these sources of error.

Issue might be taken with Sutherland's implication on pages 19, 21 and 25 that scientific treatment of criminals would require the abandonment of the attitude of blame toward offenders. Blame and punishment have legitimate functions in so far as they are effective in preventing crime. They are not legitimate toward the insane or the feebleminded in so far as they cannot influence the insane or feebleminded toward social conduct.

The above criticisms must not be interpreted as denying the worth of Sutherland's book. Its comprehensiveness, its modern point of view, its interesting style, and its extended bibliography make it a valuable addition to the literature of criminology.

HORNELL HART

Byrn Mawr College.

DELACROIX, H. *La Religion et La Foi*. Paris: Alcan, 1922. Pp. xii+451.

This book is not concerned with the origins of belief but rather with the several forms of religious faith: Implicit or Naïve Faith, with the several Faith, and the Faith of Trust (confidence).

The influence of the religious society and of the practice of the religious rites constitutes a double source of Implicit Faith (pp. 1-91). The former, called by Delacroix the *culte extatique*, is con-

cerned with the exciting effect of the crowd; it gives rise to confused states of mind which lend themselves to a spiritual interpretation. Delacroix indicates how such practices (dancing, singing, etc.) generate faith by referring to the principal laws of the action of crowds.

The latter, named here the *culte méthodique*, is a ceremonial discipline which also generates faith, since attitudes, gestures, expressions of feelings are themselves sources of feelings. Moreover, sacred objects have in themselves a power of exciting faith. A belief in the spiritual efficacy of sacred objects and rites is found in every elementary religion. An extreme form of the belief in the external objective power of certain practices is magic. Delacroix understands the genesis of magic thus: Magic is founded in desire, a desire for some particular good. Now desire naturally translates itself in spontaneous gestures, movements, words. The accidental fulfilment of the desire (a thing which may easily happen sometimes) becomes associated to such movements and words. Founded in desire, magic sustains itself by accidental successes—sometimes inevitable, as for example, rain after a period of dryness.

Sacrifice and prayer are both treated as special cases of magic: sacrifice because it pretends to exert a coercitive action on the gods; prayer because it is an attempt to compel the gods by the use of language, and because, moreover, prayer originally grew out of ritual (*i.e.*, magic). Delacroix here fails to distinguish between two types of behavior: anthropopathic (involving the recognition of a personal relation), and coercitive behavior. Prayer is essentially a case of the former.

Delacroix' view that prayer is a particular case of magic is allied to his belief that ideas of unseen personal beings are rooted in ideas of impersonal powers. This is the viewpoint of Marett and Durkheim. Delacroix says: "Un Dieu impersonnel, sans nom, sans histoire, immanent au monde . . . telle est la notion sur laquelle elle (magie) repose. . . Il semble bien que les êtres sacrés se soient formés de cette matière sacrée par une sorte de condensation." Here, as also in the confusion of magic with religion he fails to take into account the analyses of Professor Leuba.¹ Delacroix offers no

¹ Professor Leuba makes this distinction and uses it to differentiate magic from religion, taking the point of view that in the making of definitions we are concerned with what is differential, and that between magic and religion there is a clear difference in psychological attitude—magic seeks to compel by force, while religion seeks its ends by person relations: the former would coerce, the latter would persuade by gifts, supplications, etc.

factual evidence to support his view; indeed he says that he prefers not to consider deeply the debated and difficult problem of the historical and logical relations of magic and religion.

A superior form of belief is that into which reason enters; it is called by the author the *Foi Raisonnante* (pp. 92-188). Implicit Faith is the faith of many; it accompanies and sustains the Faith of Reason. The degree of rationalism present in religion varies from an extremely diluted rationalism to a very pure rationalism. The latter tries to demonstrate everything: the existence of Jesus, His miracles, the existence of God, etc.

The following are the modes of combination of reason and revelation which produce this type of faith: (1) The naïve confusion: contrary theses are accepted without reflection. (2) The learned confusion: the believer has the *impression* of comprehending the incomprehensible. (3) The conciliation: the believer supposes that there are two orders, the natural and the supernatural, and he makes the conciliation between them either at the expense of reason, of which he proclaims the inferiority, or at the expense of dogma, which he tries to adjust to the demands of science. (4) Finally, there is the willing acceptance of the contradiction (*La foi a travers la contradiction et le scandale*): the contradiction is taken as the sign and as the essential condition even as of faith.

The Faith of Trust (*foi confiance*, pp. 189-245) is very different from Reasoning Faith. The former takes dogmas as being contingent, local, changing expressions of religious experience, as having a symbolic value only. This form of faith is not rare, Pratt found it in 37 per cent of those who responded to his inquiry. It is one of the important forms of Protestantism, and is represented in the Catholic Church by the school known as Modernism—a school which is, first of all, one of historical criticism. Recognizing the value of the objections that science and reason offer to faith, it nevertheless holds that there does not need to be any conflict between faith and science, nor between faith and history, since the object of faith is not matter of science nor history, but of moral experience.

With Book 2 the author passes to an analysis of what he calls acute states of faith, *i.e.*, mysticism (pp. 247-284), prophetic inspiration (pp. 285-312), and fanaticism (pp. 313-322). Following this he investigates faith in its evolution (conversion) and its dissolution (doubt), and then in a final chapter seeks to show how creative faith behaves in the formation of religious ideas.

By mysticism Delacroix means pretension to mysterious revela-

tion and intimate union with unseen beings. Faith tends naturally toward mystic contemplation; he who has faith feels always that this faith comes not only from himself but also from the object in whom he has faith. In his analysis of ecstasy there is little that needs to be mentioned here. He has treated this topic more extensively in *Etudes d'histoire et de psychologie du Mysticism*.

Ecstasy is not confined to the domain of religion, nor is inspiration. Whenever a new idea breaks through the course of consciousness and presents itself with an appearance of spontaneity and independence there is a case of inspiration. Inspiration is the play of processes that we would not identify with ourselves.

Conversion (Book 3, Chapter 1, pp. 323-373) is not treated in detail. The author is interested only in conversion regarded as faith. Conversion is faith—"a painful, tumultuous, dolorous faith". It does not always involve a crisis: it may be simply a slow, voluntary progressive formation of belief, a change in point of view. Still the very word conversion implies a conflict of some sort. It is a renouncement, an interruption, a rupture between the me before, and the me after, a reorganization of the moral life around a new principle. The subject has a sense (1) of entering a larger life, (2) of emancipation from self, (3) of a change which has taken place in him; a change brought about, not by a simple internal process of psychological development, but by the operation in him of something stronger than himself. In the manner of its development conversion is like passion. It is like passion also in its violent antitheses, and its profound indecisions. And both conversion and passion are creations of new values: a recovery of self in the object, an afflux of energy, and full gift of self to a single task.

In the second part of the last chapter (*La foi creatrice*, pp. 401-457) Delacroix searches briefly the rôle which faith plays in the formation of religious ideas, *i.e.*, in the constitution of dogmas, myths, and rites. These are perhaps the richest pages of the book. But, since they are given as preliminary remarks to be taken up and developed at some future time, the reviewer may be excused for saying no more.

Professor Delacroix writes in an easy, attractive style and his discussions are illumined by an abundance of illustrations taken mainly from recent Roman Catholic and Protestant history. One finds in this large and substantial volume not so much exhaustive studies of a few fundamental topics than a comprehensive examination of the interrelations of reason and feeling in religious life, and

of their rôle in the formation and the destruction of religion. An intimate acquaintance with the various forms of religious life and with recent religious history, combined with a masterly understanding of the human mind, assign to this book a foremost place in the literature of the psychology of religion.

DOROTHY DURLING

Bryn Mawr College.

RÉVÉSZ, G. *The Psychology of a Musical Prodigy*. N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1925. Pp. x+180.

In the present volume Révész has brought together his observations and experiments on the musical talent of Erwin Nyiregyházi, a pianist and composer whose extraordinary achievements in music at a very early age justify calling him a musical prodigy. Nyiregyházi was born at Budapest in January, 1903. Révész began his examination of Erwin in the spring of 1910 and continued his investigations during the three following years.

The early musical achievements of Erwin were similar in many respects to those of the child Mozart. He was not one year old when he tried to imitate singing. In his second year he was able to reproduce simple melodies correctly. A year later it was discovered that he had absolute memory for pitch. By the time he was four years old he played the piano well, improvised easily, and composed little melodies with accompaniment. Systematic instruction in music began when he was five and continued without interruption until his twelfth year when he left his native land for concert tours which took him to most of the countries on the continent, to England, and later to this country. His musical development during this period, both on the interpretative and creative sides, was astonishing in its rapidity and breadth.

It is often supposed that musical talent stands in less close relation to the general level of intellectual development than does creative capacity in the other arts, and especially in the sciences. One usually points to the childhood accomplishments of some of the great musicians in support of this view. It is interesting to note, however, in this connection that Erwin's general intellectual capacities, as determined by variations of the Binet tests, were fully three years in advance of those of the average child of his age. This fact is significant when viewed in relation to the immaturity and thinness of Erwin's early compositions, remarkable as these truly are.

The bulk of Révész' book is taken up with descriptions and discussion of results of the tests which he used to determine the extent of Erwin's musical abilities. These tests ranged from fairly accurate ones used in the investigation of elementary acoustic and musical traits to much more rough and uncontrolled observations of the subject's ability in transposing, reading at sight, playing from full orchestral score, improvising, modulating, forming judgments as to relative merits of various pieces of music, composing, etc. It is trite to say that the results of these tests are interesting. If one has any interest at all in such matters he will finish the book at one sitting and will then play, or get someone to play for him, the twelve samples of Erwin's efforts at composition between the ages of seven and twelve which Révész includes in the final chapter.

The psychologist will be disappointed in Révész' book. It is obviously written with one eye, perhaps both, to the musical public; and in writing for such a public Révész has neglected too frequently the claims of his scientific colleagues. The book abounds in assertions which a psychologist would immediately challenge. In the introduction Révész states that he wrote the book for the purpose of throwing light on the great mystery of evolution and on the problems relating to the appearance of musical talent at an early age, the theory of musical genius, and the different aspects of musical talent and their investigation. One comes away from the book with the conviction that Révész has collected a wealth of extremely significant data, but also with the impression that the theoretical significance of the data and their bearing on problems in the psychology of music and musical genius could have been treated much more exhaustively. The purpose for which Révész says the book was written falls far short of realization.

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NOTES AND NEWS

DR. HELEN P. WOOLLEY, psychologist of the Merrill-Palmer School, Detroit, has been appointed director of the Institute of Child Welfare Research and professor of education at Teachers College, Columbia University.

AT the meeting of the Western Psychological Association held at Berkeley, on July 24-25, the following officers were elected for 1925-26: President, Professor W. R. Miles, Stanford University; Vice-President, Dr. Kate Gordon, Southern Branch of the University of California; Secretary, Dr. Warner Brown, University of California.

DR. M. J. VAN WAGENEN, of the department of educational psychology at the University of Minnesota, has been granted a year's leave of absence to accept an appointment as visiting lecturer in educational psychology and statistics at the University of California for the year 1925-26.

PROFESSOR HENRY T. MOORE, professor of psychology at Dartmouth College, who recently was elected to a professorship in the University of Michigan, has been elected president of Skidmore College.

DR. ROSWELL P. ANGIER has resigned as dean of freshmen at Yale University, a position held since 1920. He has resumed his position at Yale as professor of psychology and director of the psychological laboratory and has also taken on the chairmanship of the Institute of Psychology of Yale University.

DR. FRANK H. REITER, psychologist of the public schools of Newark, N. J., has been appointed Director of Special Education, Department of Education for the State of Pennsylvania.

DR. H. M. JOHNSON, formerly assistant professor of psychology at Ohio State University, has accepted the incumbency of an Industrial Fellowship at Mellon Institute of Industrial Research of the University of Pittsburgh, where he will conduct an investigation of the psychological and physiological aspects of sleep. Dr. Johnson entered on his new duties June 15.

